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Health Care Law
Breaking Down the Boundaries of

Malpractice Law
PhilipG. Peters,Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, courts have treated professional malpractice cases as unique.
When disputes that would otherwise have been governed by tort rules of general
application have arisen in the context of medical treatment, courts have routinely
constructed special rules for the resolution of those disputes. Recent evidence
suggests that this penchant for special rules may be weakening and that
malpractice law may be slowly melting back into the sea of tort doctrine.
The three Missouri health care law cases noted in this issue are the latest
evidence that courts today are more willing to resolve medical negligence actions
using tort rules of general application than they once were. These three cases
also typify the halting, labored nature of common law shifts of this kind.
All three of these cases involved bright-line "no duty" rules that had been
specifically fashioned for medical negligence cases. One case involved the duty
of "on-call" physicians. Traditionally, on-call specialists have not owed patients
a duty to arrive at the hospital quickly unless a prior "physician-patient"
relationship existed with the patient.' The second case reexamined a similar noduty rule that excuses pharmacists from a duty to warn their customers of drug
risks such as improper dosages and incompatible drugs.2 The third case
considered the viability of the "learned intermediary" doctrine, a no-duty rule
that excuses pharmaceutical manufacturers from the duty to warn patients of the
risks associated with their prescription drugs. 3 Rules like these erect tidy, bright
spheres of obligation in malpractice law that are atypical of modem tort
doctrine-a body of law that usually defines obligations with vague, but flexible,

concepts such as foreseeability and reasonability.
In two of the three Missouri cases noted here, the Missouri courts backed
away from these special duty rules. And in the third, the court was careful to
evaluate the continued wisdom of the rule before reaffirmning it. Collectively
these cases are consistent with other evidence, discussed in Part V below,
indicating that courts are increasingly willing to re-examine the special rules
formulated for health care torts.

•Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
2. See Homer v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
3. See Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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H". "ON-CALL" PHYSICIANS
In Missouri, as in most other states, physicians traditionally have no duty
to patients unless a "physician-patient" relationship exists. Across the country,
this requirement has had the effect of both immunizing careless advice given in
informal consultations4 and also excusing failures by on-call specialists to arrive
promptly at the hospital Missouri abrogated this latter immunity in Millardv.
6
Corrado.
The case involved a surgeon, Dr. Corrado, who had scheduled himself to
be on-call even though he knew that he would be over forty miles away at a
conference. The plaintiff, Marjorie Millard, was seriously hurt in an automobile
accident during the time that Dr. Corrado was away. The plaintiff alleged that
the surgeon's unavailability had aggravated her injuries. After she filed her
claim, Dr. Corrado requested a summary judgment, alleging the absence of a
physician-patient relationship and thus the absence of a legal duty to treat.
Because a number of Missouri cases had enunciated this requirement, 7 the trial
court granted his motion.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri refused
to be constrained by this narrow, wooden duty formula. Instead, it applied
traditional (and expansive) tort duty analysis to conclude that Dr. Corrado owed
an obligation to Ms. Millard. As the concurring opinion of Judge Crahan makes
clear, general principles of tort law allow recovery against someone who
undertakes to render services and then fails to do so with reasonable care.8

4. See, e.g., McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
5. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Shah, 905 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App. 1995); Fought v. Solce, 821
S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. 1991). Courts have typically looked for evidence that the on-call
specialist actually participated in the patient's diagnosis on treatment. See Corbet v.
McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d at 1045.
Absent such evidence, no physician-patient relationship exists and no duty is owed. By
contrast, at least one court has imposed a duty to treat on aprimarycare physician paid
to staff the emergency department and on the premises at the time. See Hiser v.

Randolph, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding doctor's on-call agreement with
hospital waived physician's right to insist on physician-patient relationship). In cases
involving specialists, however, courts have so far insisted on both a contract obligation
to be on-call and participation in treatment of the patient. See Shah, 905 S.W.2d at 611.
6. 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). See Jane Drummond, Note, Could
Somebody Call a Doctor? On-CallPhysiciansand the Duty to Treat, 64 MO. L. REV.
1055 (2000).
7. See Corbet, 980 S.W.2d at 166.
8. Millard,14 S.W.2d at 53-54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A
(1965)). Courts have no difficulty finding an undertaking when a defendant performs
some overt act. See JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 17 (2d
ed. 1986). However, they have struggled with cases in which the defendant has merely
promised to perform in the future. Some courts leave those cases to contract law. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 864-65 (2000). However, the contract doctrine of
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Remarkably, however, no court had previously applied this reasoning to the
duties of "on-call" physicians. This failure demonstrates how the traditional
sequestration of medical malpractice doctrine from the rest of tort law has made
it difficult for both courts and attorneys to recognize when well-established
general principles of tort law provide useful tools for analyzing a malpractice
action.9
IH. PHARMACISTS' DUTIES
In tort law, pharmacists have traditionally been viewed as assistants to
physicians, obliged only to fill prescriptions correctly. They have had no duty
to protect their patients fro'm other dangers, such as taking incompatible drugs,
even if a reasonable pharmacist would have realized the danger. This special
rule for pharmacists was an exception to the general tort obligation to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances." It was premised on the assumption
that the imposition of more extensive duties would lead pharmacists to interfere
with the physician-patient relationship."

promissory estoppel provides a tort-like remedy for such cases. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). Moreover, courts "seize upon almost any act
beyond a mere promise." KING, supra, at 20. Signing up for call should meet this test.
Furthermore, the requirement of an overt act seems to be eroding in tort law. See DOBBS,
supra, at 865-66.
9. Sadly, however, the court felt that it had to engage in some slight of hand in
order to reach its eminently reasonable result. The court divided the plaintiff's
negligence claim into two counts, one for ordinary negligence and one for medical
malpractice. Only the general negligence claim was governed by general tort duty
analysis. On the malpractice claim, formalism substituted for analysis. Under previous
holdings of the Missouri Supreme Court, the claim for medical negligence could not
succeed without proof that a physician-patient relationship had existed. Millard v.
Corrado, 14 S.W.2d 42,49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Corbet, 980 S.W.2d at 169. Therefore,
the court felt obliged to look for proof of a physician-patient relationship to preserve the
malpractice claim. There was some evidence that Dr. Corrado had discussed the
plaintiff's conduct over the phone and had made some treatment recommendations.
Millard, 14 S.W.2d at 50-52. Whether that would be sufficient to create a physicianpatient relationship is unclear under Missouri law. See Corbet, 980 S.W.2d at 169
(holding that a relationship can arise out of physical examination, billing the patient, or
a contractual obligation to treat the patient combines with participation in diagnosis or
treatment). Reliance on this test elevates form over substance. Concurring Judge
Cravens correctly points out that this episode of "treatment," while doctrinally important
under Corbet, is logically irrelevant. The plaintiff did not claim that Corrado's telephone
orders were negligent, but that he had breached a duty by not being available sooner and
in person! Under Corbet, at least as interpreted in Millard, the physician's belated
response created retroactive duties to Ms. Millard.
10. See Homer v. Spalitto, 1. S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
I1. See Homer, 1 S.W.3d at 523-24; McKee v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 782 P.2d
1045, 1055-56 (Wash. 1989).
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That was the law in Missouri until Homer v. Spalitto.2 Homer involved
a pharmacist who had filled a prescription for a strong hypnotic drug at three
times the normal dosage. The patient died a few days later of an apparent drug
overdose. When his family filed suit for wrongful death, the trial court
dismissed the action on the ground that the pharmacist's only duty was to fill the
prescription accurately, which the Homer family conceded he had fulfilled.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri
reversed, holding that pharmacists have a duty to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances. 13 The court based this holding on its belief that pharmacists
have the skills to notice errors, that pharmacists are in the best position to alert
physicians to possible errors, and that making pharmacists legally accountable
will increase the overall quality of health care.' 4 In addition, the court concluded
that any antagonism generated by pharmacist-physician interaction would be
outweighed by the public benefit." As a consequence, the court abandoned the
old duty rule that would have immunized the pharmacist's conduct and applied
the general tort obligation of reasonable care under the circumstances. 6
Although this position is still the minority view, it appears to be the modem
trend.' 7

IV. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
The last of the three health law cases noted in this issue does not fit into this
larger pattern of judicial reabsorption. In Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp.,8 the
plaintiffs alleged that the supplier of a blood clotting factor had failed to warn
them about the risk of contracting AIDS. Using the "learned intermediary"
12. See Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof'l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992).
13. The court clearly indicated that it was not passing judgment on the conduct of
the pharmacist. It specifically noted that he had consulted with someone in the
prescribing physician's office, but the court did not know the contents of that
conversation. See Homer, 1 S.W.3d at 524.
14. See id. at 523-24.
15. See id. at 523 n.5. Scholars have also suggested that pharmacists are often in
a better position than any one physician to reduce medication-based risks, as patients
often have many physicians but only one pharmacist. See David B. Brushwood, The
ProfessionalCapabilitiesand Legal Responsibilities of Pharmacists: Should "Can"
Imply "Ought"?,44 DRAKE L. REv. 439,441-42 (1996).

16. See Homer v. Spalitto, 1. S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("Anthony
Spalitto's duty was to exercise the care and prudence that a reasonably careful and
prudent pharmacist would exercise in the same or similar circumstances."). Interestingly,
pharmacists seem to embrace their new obligations. See Michele L. Homish, Note, Just
What the DoctorOrdered-OrWas It?: MissouriPharmacistsDuty of Care in the 21st
Century, 64 Mo. L. REv. 1075 (2000).
17. See Hornish, supranote 16, at 1081 & n.36, 1084-85 & n.66.
18. 3 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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doctrine, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri held
that the suppliers needed only to inform the plaintiff's physician of this risk and
did not have to inform the patients directly. 9
This case warns us not to assume that all of the special duty rules in health
care law will be abandoned. Although the courts are examining each of these
rules for its continued vitality, they retain those that they still consider to be
appropriate. In Alpha Therapeutic,the court wrote an extended analysis of the
policy reasons supporting the learned intermediary exception and concluded that
they still are persuasive.
V. COMMENTS
Malpractice law has been a distinct branch of tort law for many decades.
Its separation from mainstream tort law began late in the nineteenth century with
the adoption of a special custom-based standard of care. Thereafter, the courts
fashioned an elaborate architecture of other rules tailored specially for health
care torts. Some, like the respectable minority rule and the honest error in

judgment rule, further explained the malpractice standard of care. Others, like
the informed consent doctrine, imposed unique duties on physicians. By the late
twentieth century, malpractice law had become a special field of tort law with
its own rules and its own special problems.
After the "malpractice crises" of the 1970's and 1980's, many experts felt
that medical negligence needed an even more unique set of rules. At that time,
the American Law Institute and prominent legal scholars articulated the case for
no-fault, exclusive hospital liability." Although this idea had considerable merit,
it never generated significant support in state legislatures.
Ironically, the courts appear to be moving in the opposite direction. Not
only have they not concluded that a unique no-fault regime is necessary, but they
have begun to revisit the rules that have long differentiated traditional
malpractice law from ordinary negligence law.2' Although some of the unique

19. It further found that these physicians were already aware of the risk and,
therefore, that any failure by the supplier to inform them was not proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 421. See Bradford B. Lear, Note, The Learned Intermediary
Doctrinein the Age ofDirect to Consumer Advertising, 64 Mo. L. REV. 1101 (2000).
20. See REPORTERS' STUDY, THE AMERicAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2 ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 487-516 (1991) (outlining rationale for no-fault
medical malpractice compensation system); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF
MALPRACTICE 145-42 (1993) (same).
21. This movement away from malpractice law's special set of rules arguably
began when courts abandoned the "locality rule" that had tied the standard of care to the
physician's locality. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 865, 871 (Miss. 1985)
(requiring physicians to follow a national, rather than a local, standard of care); BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 360 (1995) (discussing the standard of care).
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malpractice rules, like the informed consent doctrine, are likely to survive this
reexamination, many others probably will not.
Across the country, state courts are quietly retreating from the custom-based
standard of care that fundamentally differentiated malpractice actions from other
negligence actions.' The "honest error in judgment" rule is also losing favor.23
Now, in Missouri at least, the bright-line "no duty" rules are also showing signs
of weakness. Increasingly, the courts are deciding medical negligence cases
using tort rules of general applicability.
This merging of malpractice law into general negligence law is consistent
with the halting twentieth century movement of tort law away from an array of
special duties and immunities and toward a general obligation of reasonable
care. The courts have, for example, partially or totally abrogated the charitable
and family immunities.' Courts and legislatures have also modified many other
special duty rules, like those governing rescue, 26 landowner obligations,27 and
recovery for emotional distress.2" Medical malpractice law appears to be
undergoing the same transition.
No one can say whether this trend will continue or how extensive its impact
will be. At present, all we have are tantalizing clues. But if it does continue,
medical malpractice cases may one day be ruled by essentially the same rules
that govern other accidental injuries. The special malpractice rules that survive
this process will be ones that remain persuasive in an era less willing to protect
physician prerogatives and less willing to assume that health care is unique. 29

22. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
MalpracticeLaw at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 185 (2000).

23. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 813-16 (Minn. 1986)
(concluding "honest error in judgment" instruction is inappropriate); McCourt v.
Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 606 (S.C. 1995) (noting "error in judgment" instruction may

confuse jury).
24. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict
Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 963-77 (1981) (discussing growth of negligence principle

and abrogation of special classifications and immunities).
25. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 131-35, at 1032-73 (5th ed. 1984) (surveying immunities).
26. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-48 (Cal.
1976) (finding that psychiatrist has duty to warn potential victims of dangerous patient);
Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Mo. 1988) (finding that
business owner has duty to protect customers from foreseeable crimes of third parties).
27. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (discarding commonlaw classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee).
28. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (allowing emotional
distress recovery to mother who witnessed child's death, but was not in danger herself);
Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768-73 (Mo. 1983) (abandoning impact rule in
emotional distress cases).
29. Tort law is not the only field of law in which courts have abandoned rules that
once treated the medical profession as unique. Antitrust law is the most obvious of
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This simplification of malpractice doctrine may be temporary, however.
The ascendancy of managed care (and whatever succeeds it) may produce a new
wave of malpractice-specific tort rules.3" If so, the movement toward merger and
reabsorption will reverse itself. However, the pruning that twentieth century
malpractice law is now experiencing guarantees that the body of malpractice law
that ultimately emerges will look very different from the one that preceded it.
In that event, future lawyers will speak not of the disappearance of malpractice
law, but of its metamorphosis.

several examples where courts have stripped the profession of previously afforded
privileges. See Peters, supra note 22, at 199-201.
30. One intriguing candidate is an expanded rule of vicarious liability for managed
care entities. See Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health PlansAccountablefor the Quality
of Care, 31 GA. L. REv. 587 (1997).
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